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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah corporation, and 
HAROLD K. BEECHER, an Individual, 
Defendants and Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10609 
This appeal raises the question of whether the Second 
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant here-
in sets forth a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted and thereby raises the question of whether an 
architect employed by an owner to prepare plans, speci-
fications and to supervise all of the work, can be negligent 
and thereby become liable to an injured employee of the 
general contractor that is injured during the construc-
tion of the job. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered a Final Order against Plain-
tiff and Appellant, holding the Second Amended Com-
plaint of Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief upon 
which relief may be granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
Court's Final Order of Dismissal of Second Amended 
Complaint and a ruling that Plaintiff and Appellant's 
Second Amended Complaint states a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint of the Plaintiff was filed. After motions 
of the Defendants, a First Amended Complaint was filed 
and shortly before the Final Order of the District Court 
dismissing the Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant, 
the Second Amended Complaint was filed. At no time 
did the Defendants and Respondents file an Answer to 
1 
either of the Complaints filed by the Plaintiff and Ap· 
pellant. The Second Amended Complaint of the Plain· 
tiff and Appellant was filed in the District Court on the ' 
16th day of March, 1966, and the Court, on the 18th day 
of March, 1966, entered an Order dismissing with prej· 
udice the Complaints of the Plaintiff. The Second 
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant is 
found in the record filed with the Supreme Court on ' 
pages 146 through 163. It seems necessary to repeat 
the pertinent terms thereof exactly for the scrutiny of 
the Court in their determination of whether the said 
Second Amended Complaint does state a cause of action 
upon which relief may be granted. 
Attached to the Second Amended Complaint was an 
exhibit identified as Exhibit "A", which was annexed to 
the Complaint and incorporated therein by reference. 
The Exhibit "A" is an Agreement by and between Salt , 
3 
Lake City Corporation and Harold K. Beecher and As-
sociates, dated the first day of March, 1960, from which 
the employment of the defendants arose. The pertinent 
portion of the Second Amended Complaint is reproduced 
3.S follows: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER 
AND ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah corporation, and 
HAROLD K. BEECHER, 
an Individual, 
Defendants 
SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 157284 
Comes now the plaintiff and complains of the defendants 
as follows: 
COUNT I 
1. That at all times herein mentioned, the defendant 
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corporation, 
was and now is a Utah corporation duly licensed to do 
business as an architect in the State of Utah and that 
during said times alleged herein, the defendant Harold K. 
Beecher, an individual, was a resident of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Utah, and was duly licensed to do business as 
an architect in the State of Utah, and at all times herein, 
was an officer, director and general manager of defendant 
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corporation and was in charge of and had general super-
vision over the defendant corporation's operations under 
that certain architect's Agreement referred to in para-
graph 2 hereof. 
2. That on or about March 1, 1960, the defendants en-
tered into an Agreement with Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, to pro-
vide professional architectural services in connection 
with the proposed construction of a Public Safety and 
Jail Building in said City, in accordance with said Agree-
ment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. That paragraphs 1 and 7 of the Agreement referred 
to in paragraph 2 above provide in part as follows: 
"1. THE ARCHITECT'S SERVICES. The architect's 
professional services consist of the necessary con-
ferences, the preparation of schematic and prelimin-
ary studies, working drawings, specifications, large 
scale and full size detail drawings for architectural, 
structural, plumbing, heating, electrical, and other 
mechanical work; assist in the drafting of forms of 
proposals and contracts to conform to Owner's stand-
ard requirements;***." 
"7. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION. The Architect 
shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site in· 
spector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect, 
during the entire time the construction work is in 
progress, whose duties shall consist of checking all 
shop drawings, for approval of the City Engineer, to 
determine the quality and acceptance of the material 
and/or equipment proposed to be used in the facil-
ities being constructed; to supervise and inspect all 
phases of the work being done." 
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4. That on or about May 20, 1960, the defendant cor-
poration, as Architect, entered into an Agreement with 
Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah, as Owner, to provide professional architectural 
services in connection with the proposed construction of 
a Public Safety and Jail Building in Salt Lake City. 
5. That paragraph 1 of the Agreement referred to in 
paragraph 4 above provides as follows: 
"1. The parties hereto hereby incorporate by ref er-
ence the terms and conditions of the Agreement en-
tered into on or about the first day of March, 1960, 
by and between the Architect and Salt Lake City 
Corporation, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Utah a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit 
"A", so far as the provisions thereof are applicable, 
and as modified by the terms and conditions con-
tained herein, and provided that the name of the 
Owner herein shall be substituted therein wherever 
the name of said Salt Lake City Corporation appears, 
and the Board of County Commissioners shall be 
substituted therein wherever the name of the City 
Commissioners appears, and the project referred to 
therein shall refer to the project herein c.escribed." 
6. That pursuant to the foregoing Agreements for 
architectural services, the defendants prepared the speci-
fications, bidding and contract documents for the con-
struction of the Public Safety and Jail Building on behalf 
of Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake County, all 
of which are set forth in that certain Contract dated 
June 18, 1963, by and between Salt Lake City, a Munici-
pal Corporation of the State of Utah, and Salt Lake 
County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Utah, act-
ing in concert and referred to therein as the Joint Au-
6 
thority and Christiansen Brothers, Inc., a corporation , 
therein called the Contractor. 
7. That the Contract referred to in paragraph 6 con-
sisted of the following complimentary documents, all of 
which formed said Contract according to paragraph 10 
of the Special Conditions thereof: The Contract, Instruc-
tions to Bidders, General Conditions, Special Conditions, 
Drawings and Specifications, Notice to Contractors, Bid 
Proposal and Bond, including all addenda incorporated in 
the documents before their execution. 
8. That paragraph 3 (b) of the General Conditions Sec-
tion of the Contract referred to in paragraph 6 above 
provides as follows: 
"3 (b). Whenever in these Specifications, the Con-
tract or any supplementary agreements or instru-
ments in which these specifications govern, the 
words 'Architect' or 'Architects and Associates' ap-
pears, it shall be interpreted to mean Harold K. 
Beecher and Associates, who, under contract, fur-
nished the Drawings and Specifications for this work 
and who will direct the supervision of the construc-
tion and is acting in cooperation with the City Engi-
neer and the County Engineer as outlined above 
through paragraph 3 and 3 (a)." 
9. That paragraph 3 ( c) and 12 (a) of the General Con-
trac t Section of Contract ref erred to i n paragraph 6 
above, provide as follows: 
"3(c). The Contractor, his Superintendent and 
Foreman, shall promptly obey and follow every 
order or direction which shall be given by the Arch-
itect and/or the City Engineer or the County Engi-
neer in accordance with the terms of the Contract." 
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"12(a). If, in the judgment of the Architect and/or 
the City Engineer or County Engineer, it is neces-
sary to close down the work due to inclement 
weather or due to other circumstances arising dur-
ing the progress of the work, that may be construed 
to be dangerous or that may be caused by non-com-
pliance with the Specifications; the Contractor shall 
comply and he shall stop all operations upon written 
notice from the Architect and/or City Engineer or 
County Engineer so to do, and the work shall remain 
closed down until further orders in writing are given 
by said Architect and/or City Engineer or County 
Engineer to the Contractor to proceed with the work 
of the project, and there shall be no claim against 
either Salt Lake City Corporation or Salt Lake Coun-
ty or the Architect or Engineers, for such action." 
10. That paragraphs 1 (b) and 17 (a) of the Special Con-
ditions Section of the Contract referred to in paragraph 
6 above provides as follows: 
"1 (b). The Contractor shall take all necessary pre-
cautions for the safety of the public and employees 
on the work and shall comply with all applicable pro-
visions of Federal, State and Municipal Safety Laws 
and Building Codes to prevent accidents or injury 
to persons on, about or adjacent to the premises 
where the work is being performed. He shall erect 
and properly maintain at all times, as required by 
the conditions and progress of the work, all neces-
sary safeguards for the protection of the public and 
workmen and shall post danger signs warning 
against hazardous conditions." 
"17 (a) . Shoring: Con tractor shall provide and be 
responsible for all temporary shoring required for 
executing and protecting the work." 
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11. That on page 2 of Section of the Contract referred 
to in paragraph 6 above, relating to "EXCAVATION 
' FILL AND GRADING'', under the sub-heading of 
"SHEET PILING" it is provided as follows: 
"In excavating near or against necessary remaining 
buildings, or to safeguard life and property when 
earth banks are too deep or are too steep, this Sub-
Contractor shall provide adequate sheet piling to 
prevent failure of adjoining foundations or to protect 
workmen." 
12. That pursuant to the Contracts hereinabove re-
ferred to, the defendants undertook the inspection of the 
construction project on behalf of Salt Lake City Corpor-
ation for the purpose of determining whether said work 
was being done in accordance with the plans, specifica-
tions and contract therefor and for the enforcement of 
safety regulations and procedures for the protection of 
workmen on said construction project. 
13. That on or about October 17, 1963, in Salt Lake City, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, at a point approx-
imately 35 yards west of Second East Street in said city 
at the construction site of an underground connecting 
service tunnel located between the Salt Lake City and 
Salt Lake County Building and the Public Safety and 
Jail Building which was part of the construction included 
within the Contracts hereinabove referred to, and which 
work was being done by Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the 
general contractor, a portion of the 25 foot high earthen 
embankment of said tunnel excavation caved in upon the 
plaintiff, a construction employee on said project, trap-
ping and crushing him under wooden cement forms, mud 
and earth, for approximately forty ( 40) minutes, caus- 1 
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ing the plaintiff to suffer total, permanent and complete 
disability and paralysis in each and every limb of his 
body, in his body trunk, in his bodily function, including 
control of vital organs and excretion, and in his muscle 
function as a result of the injuries suffered by him in said 
accident. 
14. That the excavation for the construction of said 
underground service tunnel was dangerous and unsafe, 
causing an extreme hazard to the workmen therein; that 
said excavation did not comply with the safety regula-
tions of the Utah State Industrial Commission which 
were then in force and effect; and that said defendants 
both knew said dangerous condition for many days prior 
to said accident and negligently failed to shut down the 
work on said tunnel as they had the duty and authority 
to do. 
15. That as a direct and proximate result of the de-
fendants' negligence, the plaintiff has suffered the fol-
lowing injuries and physical impairments: ... 
(a) Crushed and broken vertebrae in the neck in two 
places. 
(b) Permanent paralysis from the neck down, result-
ing in complete loss of ability to control hands, 
arms, feet, legs and bodily functions. 
(d) Kidney infection controlled by anti-biotic drugs, 
but which doctors have no hope of curing. 
( e) Constant nausea, upset stomach, inability to eat, 
and necessity of special diet. 
(f) Loss of breathing control. 
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(g) Constant and unrelenting headaches and pain in 
neck, back, legs and toes. 
(h) Constant sore throat. 
(i) Infected toenail which drugs fail to heal. 
(j) Permanent and total loss of normal bodily func-
tions such as walking, standing, sitting up, con-
trolling excreta, etc. 
(k) Loss of body tissue. 
(1) Other injuries and losses of bodily functions relat-
ing to the foregoing. 
16. That as a direct and proximate result of the defend-
ants' negligence, the plaintiff's resulting injuries have 
caused, do now cause and will in the future cause the 
plaintiff to suffer great pain and mental anguish, per-
manent confinement, continuing medical treatment and 
wasting away of body tissue; that said injuries have de-
prived the plaintiff of his normal association with his 
wife and children and they with him; that said injuries 
have rendered the plaintiff unable to provide his family 
with his loving guidance and physical and financial sup-
port; and that said injuries have permanently and totally 
disabled the plaintiff from earning a livelihood for him-
self and his family for the remainder of his natural life 
without any hope of recovery, all to his general damage 
in the swn of $520,000.00. 
17. That as a direct and proximate result of the de-
fendants' negligence and plaintiff's resultant injuries, 
the plaintiff has suffered a loss of wages in the amount 
of $20,000.00 to date and his incurred up to the present 
time doctor bills, hospital bills and special care bills, 
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nursing bills and other medical expenses in the amount 
of $30,000.00, and is at the present time undergoing con-
tinuous medical treatment for which additional special 
damages will accrue to the plaintiff prior to the trial of 
this action. 
18. That as a direct and proximate result of the de-
fendants' negligence as aforesaid, and of said injuries, it 
will in the future be necessary for plaintiff to, and he 
will, secure further medical care and attention of the 
reasonable value of $300,000.00 for which he will be re-
quired to pay said sum and by reason thereof, plaintiff 
has been further damaged in the sum of $300,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment in the 
amount of $520,000.00 general damages and $330,000.00 
special damages, together with his costs and disburse-
ments incurred herein and such other and further relief 
as the Court deems just in the premises, against each of 
the defendants jointly and severally. 
COUNT II 
Comes now the plaintiff and as an alternative cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1 - 13. As paragraphs 1 through 13 of this Count II, the 
plaintiff herein incorporates paragraphs 1 to 13, inclusive, 
of Count I. 
14. That the excavation for the construction of the said 
underground service tunnel was dangerous and unsafe, 
causing an extreme hazard to the workmen therein; that 
said excavation did not comply with the safety regula-
tions of the Utah State Industrial Commission which 
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were then in full force and effect; and that the defendants 
knew of said dangerous conditions for many days prior 
to the said accident and failed to shut down the work on 
said tunnel as they had the duty and authority to do un-
der the foregoing Agreements. 
15. That the plaintiff was a construction employee on 
said project and was therefore a member of the class of 
persons for whose benefit the provisions of the foregoing 
Agreements were intended to protect. 
16. That the defendants breached their contractual ob-
ligations to Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake 
County and to the plaintiff as a third party beneficiary 
thereof, by failing to enforce their supervisory powers 
and control over the work to see that the same complied 
with the contract therefor, and in failing to shut down 
the work as they had the authority and duty to do after 
discovering the hazardous and dangerous condition of 
said excavation. 
17. That as a direct and proximate result of said breach, 
the plaintiff has suffered the following injuries and phys-
ical impairments: ... 
18 . . . 19 . . . 20 . . are same as the Count I para-
graphs of Complaint. 
DONN E. CASSITY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
EXHIBIT "A" (See R. 156-163) 
The injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and Appellant 
herein were of such a nature that, though he lives and 
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his mind remains clear, he is totally unable to move 
knowingly so much as a single muscle below his neck. 
The Plaintiff and Appellant was a thirty-seven year old 
man at the time of the accident, having a wife and three 
children of tender age and had been on the job where he 
was injured one working shift and for approximately an 
hour prior to the cave-in which caused his injuries. Al-
though there are many facts and thence testimony that 
will be introduced into evidence in the District Court for 
the Court and jury to consider relative to the negligence 
of the Defendants and the consequent injuries to the 
Plaintiff, the only issue before the Court at this time is 
whether or not the Second Amended Complaint of the 
Plaintiff states a cause of action and thus, those facts 
which can be readily established for purposes of trial, 
will not be here set forth. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the underground connecting service tunnel was 
constructed according to the plans and specifications of 
the Defendant architects, and was an important part of 
"all of the work" that was being supervised by the De-
fendant architects. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND APPELLANT IN THAT SAID COMPLAINT 
DOES STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED, ON EACH AND ALL OF 
THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS. 
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A. WHERE A CONTRACT BETWEEN AN ARCHI-
TECT AND AN OWNER REQUIRES INSPEC-
TION AND SUPERVISION DURING CONSTRUC-
TION, THE ARCHITECT MUST EXERCISE REA- 1 
SONABLE DILIGENCE AND SKILL IN THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THAT DUTY. 
B. ARCHITECTS ARE UNDER A DUTY TO EXER-
CISE ORDINARY, REASONABLE CARE, TECH-
NICAL SKILL AND ABILITY AND DILIGENCE , 
SUCH AS rs ORDINARILY REQUIRED OF 
ARCHITECTS, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR 
PLANS, INSPECTIONS AND SUPERVISION 
DURING CONSTRUCTION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF ANY PERSON WHO FORESEEABLY 
AND WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY MIGHT 
BE INJURED BY THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO, 
REGARDLESS OF PRIVITY, AND WHETHER OR 
NOT THEY EXERCISED SUCH CARE IS A 
QUESTION FOR THE JURY. 
C. ARCHITECTS WHOSE DUTIES WERE NOT 
LIMITED TO THE PREPARATION OF PLANS 
AND SPECIFICATIONS, AND WHO WERE ALSO 
EMPLOYED TO SUPERVISE THE CONSTRUC-
TION HAD THE DUTY TO SUPERVISE THE 
PROJECT WITH DUE CARE UNDER THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES. 
D. BOTH THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND THE 
ARCHITECTS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CON-
TRACTS WITH THE OWNER AND THEIR POSI-
TIONS WERE REQUIRED TO EXERCISE DUE 
CARE AND SKILL FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
15 
THE EMPLOYEES ON THE CITY-COUNTY MU-
NICIPAL COMPLEX. 
E. THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE OF ARCHI-
TECTS WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY THE CITY-
COUNTY, NOT ONLY TO PREPARE PLANS 
AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE CITY-COUNTY COMPLEX, BUT ALSO 
TO SUPERVISE CONSTRUCTION, IN FAILING 
TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE THE SHORING 
AND THE TAPERING OF THE WALLS OF THE 
EXCAVATION TO PREVENT THE HAZARDOUS 
CONDITION FROM ARISING, OR ONCE HA V-
ING ARISEN FROM CONTINUING, RESULTING 
IN COLLAPSE OF THE WALL OF THE EXCA-
VATION AND INJURIES TO THE EMPLOYEE 
OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR IS A QUES-
TION FOR THE JURY. 
F. AN ARCHITECT IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE 
IN EXERCISING SUPERVISORY POWERS UN-
DER HIS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
G. WHERE AN ARCHITECT KNEW OR IN THE 
EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE SHOULD 
HA VE KNOWN THAT A HAZARDOUS CONDI-
TION EXISTED ENDANGERING EMPLOYEES 
OF THE CONTRACTOR, THE ARCHITECT HAD 
THE RIGHT AND THE CORRESPONDING DUTY 
TO STOP THE WORK UNTIL THE UNSAFE 
CONDITION HAD BEEN REMEDIED. 
Liability of an architect is expressed in Montijo vs. 
Swift (1963) 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 
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wherein the Plaintiff brought an action against the De-
fendant architect who had designed and supervised the 
construction of a stairway in a bus depot, for injuries 
sustained when she fell while descending said stairs. The 
court held as follows at pages 134-135 of 133 Cal. Rptr. 
2d: 
"Under the existing status of the law, an architect 
who plans and supervises construction work, as an 
independent contractor, is under a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in the course thereof for the protection 
of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable 
certainty may be injured by his failure to do so, even 
though such injury may occur after his work has 
been accepted by the person engaging his services. 
This conclusion is supported by the general prin-
ciples declared and applied in Chance vs. Lawry's 
Inc., 58 Cal-2d 368, 376, 377, 25 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374 
Pac. 2d 185; Stewart vs. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d, 857, 862-
863, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 Pac. 2d 345; Dow vs. Holly 
Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 724, 321 Pac. 2d 
736; Hale vs. DePooll, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 231, 201 Pac. 
2d 1, 13 ALR 2d 183, and Dahms vs. General Elevator 
Co., 214 Cal. 733, 738-742, 7 P. 2d 1013. (See also 
Prosser on Torts, 2nd edition, page 517; Rest. Torts 
Sec. 385.)" 
The New York Appellant Division in Clemens vs. 
Benzinger, 211 App. Div. 586, 207 N.Y.S. 539 is cited 
following a statement of a rule, at 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Archi-
tects, Sec. 25, which reads as follows: 
"An architect's liability for negligence resulting in 
personal injury or death may be based upon his 
supervisory activities or upon defects in the plans." 
In the Clemens vs. Benzinger case, the Plaintiff's de-
cedent was an employee for a steel construction com-
17 
pany building a baseball grandstand. Steel "H" columns 
were placed on concrete bases in which the plans and 
specifications required anchor bolts to be set at the time 
the concrete was poured. This was not done on certain 
columns and the anchor bolts were placed in holes drilled 
in the concrete bases and the holes were then grouted in 
with sand and cement, and part of the protruding lugs 
on the anchor bolts were removed in order to fit the 
drilled holes. The anchor bolts were so placed on the day 
prior to the accident for the column which fell striking 
the plaintiff's decedent and killing him. The falling 
column pulled the anchor bolts up about six inches and 
bent them over with green, partially hardened cement 
showing at the top of the holes. The Court held that the 
supervisory engineer who had prepared the plans and 
specifications and had charge and supervision of the 
construction was liable for negligence in the supervision 
of the work, the same as for defects in original plans. 
Thus the Court permitted recovery against the architect 
for his supervisory activities, namely his failure to notify 
the structural steel contractor of the actual conditions 
of the anchor bolts after he had authorized and directed 
the placing of the bolts in the drilled holes. See comment 
in 59 A. L. R. 2d, 1085-1086. 
In the instant case before the Court, the contract of 
employment between the Defendant Corporation and In-
dividual Architect and Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
County for architectural services in connection with the 
design and the construction of the new Public Safety and 
Jail Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, clearly provided 
that the Defendant was to prepare the contract document 
for letting the bids, for construction, and "to supervise 
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and inspect all phases of the work" to be done there-
under. (See paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Second Amended 
Complaint). Contract documents prepared by the De-
fendant for Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, where-
by the construction of a building was let to Christiansen 
Brothers, Inc. provided that ( 1) The Defendant corpora-
tion "will direct and supervise the construction" on be-
half of the City and County, (2) The Contractor "shall 
promptly obey and follow every order or direction which · 
shall be given by the architect*** in accordance with the 
terms of the contract", (3) If, in the judgment of the 
architect, it is necessary to close down the work because 
of dangerous conditions or non-compliance with the 
specifications, the contractor shall comply and stop all 
operations upon written notice from the architect until 
ordered to proceed by the architect and there shall be no 
claim against the architect for such action, ( 4) The con-
tractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety 
of the public and employees on the work, shall comply 
with all applicable provisions of all federal, state and 
municipal safety laws and building codes to prevent ac-
cidents or injuries to persons in the premises, and shall 
erect and maintain at all times all necessary safeguards 
for the protection of the public and workmen, and (5) 
In order to safeguard life and property when earth banks 
are too deep or steep, the contractor "shall provide ade-
quate sheet piling*** to protect workmen." (See para-
graphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Second Amended Com-
plaint, expressly setting forth the above contracted pro-
visions). As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, 
the Defendants undertook the performance of their su-
pervisory duties pursuant to the above designated con· 
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tracts on behalf of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
and knew of the dangerous conditions which precipitated 
the caving in of the excavation on the plaintiff for many 
days prior to the accident. (See paragraphs 12 and 14 of 
the Second Amended Complaint). (R. 146-155). 
In a 1953 case, known as Paxton vs. Alameda County, 
et al, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 Pac. 2d 934, the Plaintiff 
brought an action for injuries suffered when sheathing 
in a roof over a building being constructed for Defendant 
County pursuant to specifications prepared by Defendant 
architect, gave way as Plaintiff was carrying buckets 
of hot tar thereon. The Plaintiff alleged the architect was 
negligent in specifying one inch by six inch sheathing 
with a spread of thirty inches between the rafters, and 
that the county was negligent for approving such plans, 
and, additionally, that sheathing of lower grade than that 
specified was used and the county was chargeable with 
notice thereof through its agents who supervised and in-
spected the work of construction. The architect in that 
case had the contractual obligation to prepare the plans 
and specifications and to direct and supervise the con-
struction work and thereby was the responsible agent of 
the county to see that the building was completed in strict 
accordance with the plans and specifications therefor. 
Plaintiff recovered a $25,000 judgment against the arch-
itect and the county. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court 
held that the evidence was insufficient to support a find-
ing that the architect had negligently specified sheathing 
material which was of insufficient strength and, there-
fore, reversed the judgment against the architect upon 
the narrow allegation of negligence against him con-
tained in the complaint. As to the county, the Appellate 
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Court affirmed the judgment upon the ground that 
sheathing of a lower grade than specified was used re-
sulting in a dangerous and defective condition, the arch-
itect had notice thereof and had authority to remedy the 
condition and that the county's agent, the architect, had 
discovered the inferior lumber prior to its placement on 
the roof and was negligent in not making another inspec-
tion of the roof until after the sheathing was in place. In 
so holding the court recognized the liability of the county 
for the negligent acts of the architect as its agent and in 
order to clarify the anomaly of the agent not being jointly 
liable with the county for his negligent acts, the court 
stated in footnote 5 on page 945 of 259 Pac. 2d Rptr. as 
follows: 
"While it may seem anomalous to hold the principal 
(the county) and not the agents (Hass) liable, the 
reason is that the cause of action against Hass was 
narrowly limited to alleged "specification" of in-
ferior material, but was not thus limited as against 
the county." 
The undisputed import of the holding in this case 
which is almost identical to the case at bar with respect 
to the failure of the architect to exercise his supervisory 
powers is that the architect would have been jointly li-
able with the county for his negligent omission which re-
sulted in injury to the plaintiff, had the complaint been 
so drafted. Any other conclusion would violate every 
recognized rule of agency and liability under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior. Thus the Court permitted an em-
ployee on the job to recover against the principal county 
for the negligent supervision and inspection of the con-
struction work by the architect agent. An error in 
21 
pleading only permitted the architect to avoid joint lia-
bility with the county in the Paxton case. 
In the case of Craviolini vs. Scholer and Fuller As-
sociated Architects, 89 Ariz. 24, 357 Pac. 2d 611, the court 
observed as follows at page 614 of 357 Pac. 2d Rptr.: 
·'Thus the architect has no immunity as an archi-
tect;**':' he may in the construction of a building 
assume many roles - planner, designer, supervisor, 
arbitrator and owner's agent. In the role of arbi-
trator, and in that role alone, goes the cloak of im-
rn.unity." 
In 1965, the Illinois Appellate Court, in a case known 
as Miller vs. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N. E. 2d 249, 
sustained a jury verdict against defendant architects 
wherein the jury had held in favor of three injured em-
ployees of the contractor and found the architects negli-
gent in the supervision of the work and awarded Miller 
$30,000; Furry $90,000 and Plaintiff Engel $5,000 against 
the defendant architects under both the negligent count 
of the complaint as well as the structural work act count 
of the Plaintiff's Complaint. In this case, the defendant-
architect prepared plans to remodel the west wall of a 
gymnasium. The architects prepared the necessary plans, 
specifications and proposed contracts and caused bids 
to be received which resulted in the letting of three con-
tracts, one to Fisher-Stoune, Inc. for the general con-
struction work, one for the plumbing and heating and 
one for the electrical work. Plans for the remodeling job 
called for the renewal of the west wall of the gymnasium; 
removal of a proscenium truss from that point to the new 
west wall of the new gymnasium; the removal of two 
steel columns in the old west wall, which together with 
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the proscenium truss originally supported the west ends 
of four east-west roof trusses; the substitution of a new 
north-south main bearing truss into which would be 
fastened the west ends of the old roof trusses and the 
east ends of the trusses in the new structure. 
The relevant provision of the contract between the 
architects and the school district were as follows: 
"l. The Architect's Services: The architect's profes-
sional services consist of the necessary conference, 
the preparation of preliminary studies, working 
drawings, specifications, large scale and full size de-
tail drawings, for architectural, structural, plumb-
ing, heating, electrical and other mechanical work; 
obtaining approval of government agencies having 
jurisdiction over certain phases of the work consist-
ing of fire marshall, health department, county 
superintendent of schools and department of educa-
tion; assistance in the drafting of forms of proposals 
and contracts; the issuance of certificates of pay-
ment, the keeping of accounts, and the general ad-
ministration of the construction contracts and super- 1 
vision of the work." (Emphasis added) 
* * * * 
"6. Supervision of the Work: The architect will en-
deavor to guard the owner against defects and de-
ficiency in the work of the contractors, but he does 
not guarantee the performance of their contracts. 
The supervision of an architect is to be distinguished 
from the continuous personal superintendance to be 
obtained by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works. 
When authorized by the owner, a clerk-of-the-works 
acceptable to both Owner and Architect shall be en-
gaged by the architect at a salary satisfactory to the 
Owner, and paid by the Owner, upon presentation 
of the Architect's monthly statements." 
23 
The construction contract between Fisher-Stoune, Inc. 
and the school district provided in its relevant parts, as 
follows: 
"Article 1. Scope of the Work. 
'The General Contractor shall furnish all of the ma-
terials and perform all of the work to complete the 
general work shown on the drawings and described 
in the specifications entitled 'Second Addition to 
Maroa High School, Community Unit School District 
No. 2, Makin and DeWitt Counties, Illinois'." 
"Article 6. The Contract Documents. 
"The general conditions of the contract, the specifi-
cations and the drawings, together with this Agree-
ment, form the contract and they are as fully a part 
of the contract as if attached or herein repeated." 
"Article 12. Protection of Work and Property. 
"The Contractor shall continuously maintain ade-
quate protection of all his work from damage and 
shall protect the Owner's property from injury or 
loss arising in connection with this contract. He shall 
make good any such damage, injury or loss except 
such as may be directly due to errors in the contract 
documents or caused by agents or employees of the 
Owner or due to causes beyond the contractor's con-
trol and not to his fault or negligence. He shall ade-
quately protect adjacent property as provided by law 
and the contract documents." 
"The contractor shall take all necessary precautions 
for the safety of the employees on the work and shall 
comply with all applicable provtsions of federal, state 
and municipal safety laws and building codes to pre-
vent accident or injury to persons on, about or ad-
jacent to the premises where the work is being per-
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formed. He shall erect and properly maintain at all 
times as required by the conditions and progress of 
the work all necessary safeguards for the protection 
of the workmen and the public and shall post danger 
signs warning against the hazards created by such 
features of construction as protruding nails, holes, 
elevator hatchways, scaffolding, window openings, 
stairways and falling materials; and he shall desig-
nate a responsible member of his organization on the 
work, whose duty shall be the prevention of acci-
dents. The name and position of any person so desig-
nated shall be reported to the Architect by the Con-
tractor." (Emphasis added) 
"Article 13. Inspection of Work. 
"The Architect and his representative shall at all 
times have access to the work wherever it is in pre-
paration or progress and the Contractor shall provide 
proper facilities for such access and for inspection." 
"Article 14. Superintendent: Supervision: 
"The Contractor shall keep on his work during its 
progress a competent superintendent and any neces- 1 
sary assistants, all satisfactory to the Architect ... " 
"The Contractor shall give efficient supervision to 
the work using his best skill and attention ... " 
"Article 15. Changes in the Work: 
" ... In giving instructions, the Architect shall have 
authority to make minor changes in the work not in-
volving extra cost and not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the building ... " 
"Article 19. Correction of Work Before Final Pay-
ment: 
"The Contractor shall promptly remove from the 
premises all work condemned by the Architect as 
failing to conform to the Contract ... " 
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"Article 38. Architect's Status. 
"The Architect shall have general superv1s10n and 
direction of the work ... He (the Architect) has 
authority to stop the work whenever such stoppage 
may be necessary to insure the proper execution of 
the Contract ... " 
"Article 55. Protection: 
''Bracing, shoring and sheeting: The Contractor 
shall provide all bracing, shoring and sheeting as 
required for safety and for the proper execution of 
the work and have same removed when the work is 
completed." 
The Illinois Appellate Court took into consideration 
the contractual provisions between Architect and Owner 
and between Owner and Contractor as well as the con-
duct of the Architect in determining whether or not the 
verdict of the jury that the Architect was negligent by 
omission in causing the injuries to the plaintiffs. The 
Court refers to the Paxton vs. Alameda case, ibid. as 
follows: (Emphasis added) 
"The only complaint of the Plaintiff against the 
Architect there was of alleged negligence in the 
plans and specifications, not in any supervision, and 
on the particular facts there presented, which are not 
analagous to those here, they were held not negli-
gent. But the defendant county was held liable be-
cause the sheeting actually used was not as specified, 
was insufficient, and the Architect had authority to 
remedy such and did not do so. By implication at 
least, it would seem that had the Complaint against 
the defendant Architects been based on alleged neg-
ligent supervision (as well as alleged negligent plans 
and specifications), which for some reason it was not, 
the court likely would have held the Architects liable 
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consistent with its determination of the cause as 
against the defendant county." 
The opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in Miller 
vs. DeWitt continues as follows: 
"Under the Agreement of the Owner and the de-
fendant's Architects here, they were to perform pro-
fessional services, consisting of, so far as now rele-
vant, conferences, preliminary studies, working 
drawings, specifications, large scale and full size de-
tail drawings for architectural, structural, plumbing, 
heating, electrical and other mechanical work, etc., 
assisting in drafting proposals and contracts, etc. and 
the general administration of the construction con-
tracts and supervision of the work . . . The super-
vision of the Architects was to be distinguished from 
the continuous personal superintendance to be ob-
tained by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works .. 
The Contractor was to take all necessary precautions 
for the safety of employees on the work, comply with ' 
all applicable provisions of state laws to prevent acci-
dents or injury to persons on, about or adjacent to 
the premises and designate a responsible member of ' 
his organization on the work whose duty shall be 
the prevention of accidents, the name and position of 
such person to be reported to the Architect. The 
Architect was to have at all times access to the 
work ... the Contractor must not have or permit , 
any part of the structure to be loaded with a weight 
that will endanger its safety. He must provide all 
bracing, shoring and sheeting required for safety 
and for proper execution of the work ... Although 
we do not believe there is any significant applicable 
ambiguity in the several agreements and contract , 
documents as to the Architects' functions, if it be 
thought these qualifications lend some ambiguity, 
the several documents having been prepared by the 
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Architects are to be construed where construction is 
necessary, most strongly against them. They had 
general supervision and direction of the work, they 
had authority to stop the work whenever necessary 
to insure proper execution of the contract, they were 
in the first instance, the interpreters of the contract 
and the judges of the performance, they had to use 
their powers thereunder to enforce its faithful per-
formance, and they had to, within a reasonable time, 
make decisions on all matters as to the execution and 
progress of the work and interpretation of the con-
tract documents ... They were to have at all times 
access to the work wherever it was in preparation 
or progress . . . They could condemn any work as 
failing to conform to the contract whether incorpor-
ated or not and the Contractor must remove such. 
The General Contractor, the general administration 
of whose Contract and supervision and direction of 
whose work was vested in the Architects, who were 
to endeavor to guard against defects and deficiency 
therein, who could stop the work when necessary, 
who were the first interpreters of the Contract and 
first judges of its performance, who were to enforce 
its faithful performance and make decisions on all 
matters as to execution and progress of the work 
and interpretation of the documents, was to do the 
general work shown on the drawings and specifica-
tions and do everything required by the Agreement, 
general conditions, specifications and drawings, to 
take all necessary precautions for the safety of em-
ployees, to comply with all applicable state safety 
laws to prevent accidents or injury, to have a re-
sponsible member on the work to prevent accidents, 
to keep on the work a competent superintendent and 
any necessary assistants, to give efficient supervision 
to the work, using his best skill and attention, and 
carefully study and compare all drawings, specifica-
28 
tions and other instructions, to not have or permit 
any part of the structure to be loaded as to endanger 
its safety, to provide all bracing and shoring required 
for safety and proper execution of the work, to com-
plete all structural steel, to carefully shore and brace 
existing structural steel for installation of new steel 
to carefully remove the existing truss re-used, and 
to provide new connections for the existing trusses 
and other structural steel members." 
"Such were the functions of the Defendant's Arch-
itects including the things the general contractor 
was to do under his contract and his work, the gen- 1 
eral administration of which contract and supervi-
sion and direction of which work was vested in the 
Architects." 
The above itemization by the Illinois Appellate Court 
of the duties and obligations of the Contractor which 
were to be supervised and approved by the Architects 
under the provisions of the respective Contracts, are si1n-
ilar as explained in the pleading entitled Second 
Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff and Appellant here- ' 
in and the following language of the Illinois Appellate 
Court is applicable to the instant case as well, which 
reads as follows: 
"The terms of the Architects' employment are gov-
erned by the terms of the contracts entered into. 
Their duties here were not limited to the preparation 
of plans and specifications. They also included in 
addition supervision of construction. The Architects 
in contracting for their services, implied that they 
possessed skill and ability sufficient to enable them 1 
to perform the required services at least ordinarily 
and reasonably well and that they would exercise 
and apply in the case their skill, ability and judgment 
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reasonably and without neglect. They held them-
selves out as experts in their particular line of work 
and were employed because they were believed to be 
such. The skill and diligence which they were bound 
to exercise are such as are ordinarily required of 
architects. The efficiency of an Architect in the pre-
paration of plans and specifications is tested by the 
rule of ordinary and reasonable skill usually exer-
cised by one in that profession. He must guard 
against defects in the plans as to design, materials 
and construction and he must keep abreast of the im-
provements of the times. In the absence of a special 
agreement, their undertaking did not imply or guar-
antee a perfect plan or satisfactory results and they 
are liable only for failure to exercise reasonable care 
and skill. The degree of skill and care which may be 
required of them in the preparation of their plans 
was a question for the jury. An Architect will be 
liable where by reason of his breach of duty to exer-
cise care and skill, his plans and specifications were 
faulty and defective as to design, materials or con-
struction. Liability rests on unskillfulness or negli-
gence, not upon mere errors of judgment and the 
question of the Architect's negligence in the prepar-
ation of plans is one of fact and within the province 
of the jury." 
The Illinois Appellate Court went on to discuss further 
possible areas of negligence on the part of the Architects 
which is particularly applicable to the instant case. The 
Court continued as follows: 
"The Architects may be liable for negligence in fail-
ing to exercise the ordinary skill of their profession, 
which results in the erection of an unsafe structure, 
whereby anyone lawfully on the premises is injured. 
Their possible liability for negligence resulting in 
personal injuries may be based upon thei~ super-
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visory activities or upon defects in the plans or both. 
Their possible liability is not limited to the owner 
who employed them. Privity of Contract is not a 
prerequisite to liability. They were under a duty to 
exercise ordinary reasonable care, technical skill and 
ability and diligence as are ordinarily required of 
Architects in the course of their plans, inspections 
and supervision during construction for the protec-
tion of any person who foreseeably and with reason-
able certainty might be injured by their failure to 
do so, and whether or not they so eocercise such is a 
question to be determined by the jury. The position 
and authority of the Architects here under these 
documents and these facts and circumstances were 
such that they necessarily labor under a duty, inter 
alia, to supervise the project with due care under the 
circumstances. Too much control over the general 
contractor necessarily rests with the Architects un-
der these facts for them not to be placed under a duty 
imposed by law to perform without negligence all 
their functions, including plans, specificatibns, gen-
eral administration of the construction contracts, 
and supervision and direction of the work. Their 
power to stop the work is, alone, a drastic power, 
and that authority and all their other extensive au-
thority as it relates to administration, supervision 
and direction, necessarily carries commensurate legal 
responsibility. The Architects were to be paid in part 
to do their best to see to it that the terms of the con-
tract between the Owner and the general contractor 
were complied with. They were employed in part, 
not so much to detect the fact that the general con-
tractor had erected inadequate temporary supports, 
shoring, columns, or towers, if they were inadequate, , 
as they were to use their best efforts, skill, judgment, 
care and experience to guard against and prevent 
that being done. Both the general contractor and the 
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Architects by virtue of their contract with the Owner 
and their positions were required to exercise care 
and skill for the protection of the employees on the 
job. It must have been reasonably within the Arch-
itects' contemplation when directing their minds to 
the removal and relocation of the old north-south 
proscenium truss, ... that such persons as the plain-
tijf s employees on the jobs would necessarily be af-
fected by the Architects' several pertinent decisions 
in the course thereof." (Emphasis added) 
The Architects urged the Court to conclude that the 
liability of the Architects was limited to design and use 
of materials, etc., and the Court answered this problem 
appropriately as follows: 
"The Defendants Architects urge that under a con-
tract to "supervise the work" of construction, an 
Architect undertakes only a duty to see that a build-
ing is constructed, which, when completed, meets 
the plans and specifications and is the building for 
which the Owner contracted and that he has no 
rights or duties with regard to the manner or means 
or techniques of construction adopted by the con-
tractor to produce that end result. One of the De-
fendants Architects' duties here undoubtedly was 
as they say, but that was by no means their only 
duty. Under these contracts and associated docu-
ments, they had many other powers, authorities, re-
sponsibilities and duties. Some of their rights and 
correvelant duties did relate to some of what the 
Defendants Architects possf.bly refer to as manners 
or means or techniques of construction of the con-
tractor. But it would be useless to exercise in seman-
tics and speculation to endeavor to examine or define 
or classify (which the Architects here do not do) 
what is means by manners or means or techniques of 
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construction of the contractor and as to which ones 
the Architects had duties and as to which ones they 
had no duties. Under these contracts and documents 
and under these facts and circumstances, they have 
substantial relevant and applicable duties to persons 
in the position of these Plaintiffs as we've set forth 
whether those be considered to relate, in part, t~ 
what are possibly denominated to be manners or 
means or techniques of construction or to something 
else." (Emphasis added) , 
The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed 
the Illinois Appellate Court decision and filed the Su- , 
preme Court decision on approximately the 24th of 
March, 1966, and although Appellant herein has a copy 
of the Supreme Court decision, unfortunately at the time 
of this printing does not have a copy of the citation. How-
ever, by time of argument of the case before the Supreme 
Court herein, it is anticipated that a citation will be 
available. The Supreme Court, after first reviewing some 
of the pertinent facts relative to provisions in the Owner-
Architect Contract and the Owner-Contractor Contract ' 
stated in brief as follows relative to the negligence of the 
Architects: 
"It appears that the parties agree that Architects 
must exercise reasonable care in the performance of 
their duties and may be liable to persons who may 
foreseeably be injured by their failure to exercise 
such care, regardless of privity. The principal ques-
tion is the extent of the Architects' duties. It is clear 
from the evidence that the Architects did not pre-
pare detailed specifications for the temporary shor- 1 
ing of the gymnasium roof, nor did they compute on 
the plans the load that would be placed upon the 
shores, or provide the contractor with a safety factor 
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to be used in the shoring. It also appears that the 
Architects did not oversee and inspect the shoring 
as used. 
"As we view the record, the finding of negligence on 
the part of the Architects must be based upon one or 
more of these omissions. As a general rule, it has 
been said that the general duty to "supervise the 
work" merely creates a duty to see that the building, 
when constructed, meets the plans and specifications 
contracted for. Clinton vs. Boehm, 124 N. Y. S. 789, 
139 App. Div. 73; Garden City Floral Company vs. 
Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 Pac. 2d 352, 356; Day vs. 
National U. S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 
2d 660, 666. 
"In the present case, the contract between the school 
district and the contractor, which was prepared by 
the Architects, provided in part as follows: 
'The Contractor shall provide all bracing, shoring 
and sheeting as required for safety and for the 
proper execution of the work. * * * 
'Existing structural steel shall be carefully shored 
and braced as required for installation of new con-
necting steel. Existing truss re-used shall be care-
fully removed, revised and re-erected as called 
for***. 
"Despite the argument of the Architects that the 
shoring here was a method or technique of construc-
tion over which they had no control, we feel that 
under the terms of the contracts, the Architects had 
the right to interfere if the Contractor began to shore 
in an obviously unsafe and hazardous manner. We 
agree with the Architects that they had no duty to 
specify the method the contractor would use in shor-
ing, but we believe that under the terms of these 
contracts, the Architects had the right to insist upon 
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a safe and adequate use of the method. Cf. Charles 
Meads & Co. vs. City of New York, 181 N.Y.S. 704 
706." , 
The Court continues its analysis of the case hitting at 
the very heart of this Plaintiff-Appellant's case before 
this Court, as follows: 
"From a careful examination of the record, we con-
clude that if the Architects knew, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have known that the shor- ' 
ing was inadequate and unsafe, they had the right 
and corresponding duty to stop the work until the 
unsafe condition had been remedied. (Earhart vs. ' 
Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 2d 869). If the 1 
Architects breached such a duty, they would be , 
l~able to these Plaintiffs who could foreseeably be 
injured by the breach. (Emphasis added) 
"Here it appears that the shoring and removal of part 
of the old gymnasium roof was a major part of the 
entire remodeling operation and one that involved 
obvious hazards. We think that the shoring opera-
tion was of such importance that the jury could find , 
from the evidence that the Architects were guilty of 
negligence in failing to inspect and watch over the 
shoring operation. Cf. Day vs. National U. S. Radia-
tor Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660. 
"We therefore find that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to direct a verdict for defendants on the ' 
commonlaw negligence counts." (Emphasis added) 
The excavated tunnel of a depth of approximately 25 
feet was a substantial part of the construction work re-
lated to the Salt Lake City-County Municipal Complex 
which the defendants Architects had contracted to 
"supervise and inspect all phases of the work being 
done". The facts of the case, when once permitted to be 
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adduced before the Court and jury will show that the 
Architect, in fact, knew that the excavation had been 
done for some days and weeks prior to the injuries of the 
plaintiff in a manner contrary to the statutory require-
ments imposed upon those who would so excavate to 
such a depth. The evidence will show that the shoring 
and taper of the walls of the trench were not only ob-
viously unsafe and hazardous, but that the Architect at 
all times was fully aware of the said unsafe and hazard-
ous condition. As in the Miller vs. DeWitt case, the De-
fendant Architects in the instant case had the right to 
stop the work until the unsafe condition had been rem-
edied, but at no time did so. Certainly as in the opinion 
above stated, the Defendants Architects had not only the 
right, but "the corresponding duty to stop the work until 
the unsafe condition had been remedied." In the instant 
case the Defendant Architects breached the duty owing 
to the Plaintiff. In the instant case, as the evidence will 
indicate, the Defendants Architects at all times, while 
the excavation and work was being carried on by the 
contractor upon the particular tunnel area, had a qual-
ified on-site inspector, which was acceptable to both the 
Owner and the Architects during the entire time the con-
struction work was in progress, supervising and inspect-
ing all phases of the work being done and was fully aware 
of conditions and progress of the work, and reported 
daily to his superiors Defendants Architects. In addition 
to this, the Architects were upon the job on numerous 
occasions and observed personally and in behalf of the 
defendant Architect Corporation the progress of the 
work, the hazardous condition, and on at least one oc-
casion had a conference relative to the hazardous con-
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dition wherein it was very thoroughly discussed by the 
Contractor, representatives of the Owner, and the Arch-
itect himself, together with his on-site inspector. 
It is important to note, in light of the Miller vs. DeWitt 
opinion, that in the complaint of the Plaintiff herein, 
there is no allegation that the Architects negligently pre- , 
pared plans or specifications for shoring or in any way 
negligently prepared plans and specifications relating to 
the work from which the injuries resulted. The Supreme 
Court of Illinois covers this subject as follows: 
"There is no evidence that it is the customary or 
usual practice for Architects to plan shoring or pro-
vide specifications therefor. There is no evidence that 
the Contractor relied on the plans or specifications or 
requested advice of the Architects in constructing 
the shoring. All of the testimony of the Architects 
who appeared as experts indicated that the plans 
and specifications were sufficient and proper. Only 
one witness, Dean Wurth, an engineer, but not a 
licensed Architect, testified over objection, that a 
structural engineer should indicate the load to be 
shored on the drawing. There was no testimony that 
this was necessary to meet the standard of learning, 
skill and conduct ordinarily possessed by Architects 
or even structural engineers, practicing in the same 
or similar localities. See Paxton vs. Alameda Co., 
119 Cal. App. 383, 259 Pac. 2d 934, 938. 
"We feel that except for the duty to stop work in the 
event of an obviously hazardous dereliction of duty 
on the part of the contractor, the Architects were 
under no duty with regard to the methods, means, 
or techniques used by the Contractor to shore the 
roof." 
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In the instant case as alleged, the defendants failed to 
shut down the work and require the hazardous condition 
to be corrected when they knew or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have known that a hazardous 
and dangerous condition existed which might foresee-
ably injure the plaintiffs or other employees of the con-
tractor. (R. 150 Par. 14) The Supreme Court of Illinois 
in the Miller vs. DeWitt case, while upholding the Illinois 
Appellate Division as to the liability and the negligence 
of the Architect remanded the case for a trial. The lower 
court had instructed the jury on certain allegations of 
negligence in the Complaint of the Plaintiffs, but refused 
all of the Defendants' tendered instructions relating to 
the extent or limitation of the Architect's responsibility 
for the shoring method used. The Court felt that since 
the jury had been instructed that the Architects perhaps 
were responsible for the method and technique used in 
shoring, etc., that the jury might have erroneously relied 
upon the instructions and held the Architects negligent 
for their failure to specify procedures, techniques, etc. 
for the shoring instead of the basis upon which the jury 
could have found the Defendant Architects negligent 
and liable, according to law which in such a case is the 
failure of the Architects to inspect and watch over the 
shoring operation and to exercise the "right and cor-
responding duty to stop the work until the unsafe con-
dition had been remedied." 
In Plaintiff's case, the Defendants executed a contract 
which required that the Architects Defendants "super-
vise and inspect all phases of the work being done". The 
construction contract provided that the Defendants "will 
direct the supervision of the construction". The said con-
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tract also provided that the Contractor "shall promptly 
obey and follow every order or direction which shall be 
given by the Architect and/or the City Engineer or the 
County Engineer in accordance with the terms of the 
contract". The construction contract also provided that 
"If in the judgment of the Arch~l-tect and/or the City En-
gineer or the County Engineer, it is necessary to close 
down the work due to inclement weather or due to other 
circumstances arising during the progress of the work, 
that may be construed to be dangerous or that may be 
caused by noncompliance with the specifications; the 
contractor shall comply and he shall stop all operations 
upon written notice from the Architect and/or City Engi-
neer or the County Engineer so to do, and the work shall 
remain closed down until further orders in writing are 
given by said Architect and/or City Engineer or County 
Engineer ... " (Emphasis added) 
The supervisory and inspection duty of the defendants 
relate to "all phases of the work being done" under the 
construction contract and the plans and specifications 
prepared by the defendants. A phase of the work is re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 (b) and 17 (a) of the special 
condition section of the construction contract wherein 
the contractor was required in his work, "supervised and 
inspected" by the defendants to 1 (b) "take all necessary 
precautions for the safety of the public and employees 
on the work and shall comply with all applicable provi· 
sions of Federal, state and municipal laws and building 
codes to prevent accidents or injury on, about or adjacent 
to the premises where the work is being performed ... " 
Under 17 (a) of the construction contract under the 
title Shoring, the contract reads as follows: 
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"Contractor shall provide and be responsible for all 
temporary shoring required for "executing and pro-
tecting the work". 
Can it be reasonably argued that Defendants were to 
supervise and inspect all phases of the work, yet be al-
lowed arbitrarily to distinguish from their contractual 
duty some "phases" of the work as being outside or be-
yond Defendants' contractual duty? Such reasoning 
would make a shambles and mockery of the intent and 
specific language of the contract between the Defendants 
and Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, dated March 1, 
1960. Such a reasoning would also make ineffectual and 
verbage of the sections of the construction contract re-
lating to the powers of supervision of the Architect as 
recited here and in Plaintiff's Second Amended Com-
plaint. 
The Architect, in part, was employed to see that the 
contractor performed as per the construction agreement 
and built as per the plans and specifications prepared by 
the defendants. Certain duties arose as a consequence of 
the agreement, "to supervise and inspect all phases of 
the work". Reasonably the intent and belief of the "Own-
er" was that the Defendants were qualified to supervise 
and inspect and to "exercise" sound judgments and is-
sue sound directives wherever they, as allowed and re-
quired by the said contracts, did so, as a result of their 
efforts expended to complete construction within the 
terms of the plans, specifications, construction agreement 
and "all phases of the work". The Defendants and Re-
spondents have contended in arguments heretofore that 
there was no duty on the Defendants to supervise the 
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work or to shut down work unless the specific work in 
progress was being performed contrary to the plans and 
specifications prepared by the Architect which, of course, 
violates the very reasoning the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Miller vs. DeWitt. The fact is the excavation of the trench 
as a phase of the work was performed contrary to law, , 
and contrary to safety of personnel employed on the 
work. As alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Com. 
plaint, paragraph 14, the Defendants knew by their in- ' 
spection and contract with government safety inspectors 
and by their own experience that this phase of the work • 
being performed by the Contractor was creating a haz. , 
ardous condition; they knew that the Defendants by , 
terms of the agreements and power vested in them as 
Architects could require a shut down of that phase of the 
work until it was made safe; and Defendants knew their 
judgment was not subject to "claim" by the Architect. 
(See Paragraph 9, Plaintiff's Second Amended Com-
plaint, Page 4, Line 8, R. 149). 
Despite full knowledge of the existence of the hazard 
and danger to "employees on the work" and the unlawful 
and negligent manner in which the excavation phase of 
the work was being performed for many days before the 
injuries to Plaintiff, the Defendants, as the contractually 
and lawfully constituted supervisor and inspector of the 
work, allowed unlawfully hazardous and dangerous 
progress of that phase of the work to continue until an • 
uninformed employee was damaged for the balance of 
his life. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law by the reasoning of the Courts throughout the 
land requires the conclusion that in the instant case the 
Complaint of Arthur Nauman does state a cause of action 
upon which relief may be granted against the Defend-
ants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DONN E. CASSITY 
EUGENE H. DAVIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
